Rethinking Intrinsic Value & Other Essays on the Good

This volume contains a selection of essays on value, well-being, and desert by Shelly Kagan. 

The essays are grouped into three parts. Part I contains an essay on the nature of intrinsic value which argues for the surprising claim that an object’s intrinsic value may sometimes depend on its relational properties, including its instrumental value. The essays in Part II explore the nature of well-being.  Casting doubt on the standard “tripartite” division of theories of well-being, they propose and investigate a hybrid theory that combines elements from hedonism and objective list theories. They ask whether the question of how well off an individual is is the same as the question of how well their life is going, and they raise the important but neglected question:  What is the opposite of well-being?  Part III brings together essays on desert.  Drawing on the distinction between comparative and noncomparative desert claims, they offer a new theory of comparative desert, they argue that equality actually derives it moral significance from the more fundamental value of desert itself, and they ask whether desert sensitive moral theories can escape the threat of infinite regress.  Throughout, the use of graphs allows the reader to visualize the essential structure of rival moral theories.

The volume contains an introduction co-written by the two editors and a preface by Kagan, as well as a commentary by the two editors identifying connections between Kagan’s published works, in addition to noting criticisms and developments of his work by other philosophers. The volume is the second of a two-volume collection of Kagan’s essays. Its predecessor, The Structure of Normative Ethics & Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, collects essays on the structure and methods of normative ethics.