Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Proceedings for Computer Ethics |
| Subtitle of host publication | Philosophical Enquiry (Cepe 2000) |
| Editors | D. Johnson, J. Moor, H. Tavani |
| Place of Publication | Hanover, New Hampshire |
| Publisher | Dartmouth |
| Pages | 317-328 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Publication status | Published - 2000 |
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Rethinking Moral Responsibility. / Vedder, A.H.
Proceedings for Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry (Cepe 2000). ed. / D. Johnson; J. Moor; H. Tavani. Hanover, New Hampshire : Dartmouth, 2000. p. 317-328.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Scientific › peer-review
TY - CHAP
T1 - Rethinking Moral Responsibility
AU - Vedder, A.H.
N1 - Pagination: 12
PY - 2000
Y1 - 2000
N2 - Questions regarding the moral responsibility of Internet access and service providers relating to possible negative aspects of information on the Internet call for a reassessment of the ways in which we think about attributing blame, guilt, and duties of reparation and compensation. They invite us to borrow something similar to the idea of strict liability from the legal sphere and to introduce it to morality and ethical theory. Lifting such a category from the domain of law and introducing it to ethics, however, is a difficult thing. Doing so seems to conflict with some broadly shared and deeply felt intuitions regarding the individuality of responsibility and the relationship between responsibility and guilt. These convictions coincide with some basic ideas in Kantian moral theory and the ascriptive theory that they entail. In this paper, it is shown that the seriousness of the problems to which the proposed responsibilities relate does not seem to leave room for resignation or aloofness. Furthermore, it is shown that the idea of strict liability is compatible with our traditional ways of attributing moral responsibility in more respects than one may think at first sight.
AB - Questions regarding the moral responsibility of Internet access and service providers relating to possible negative aspects of information on the Internet call for a reassessment of the ways in which we think about attributing blame, guilt, and duties of reparation and compensation. They invite us to borrow something similar to the idea of strict liability from the legal sphere and to introduce it to morality and ethical theory. Lifting such a category from the domain of law and introducing it to ethics, however, is a difficult thing. Doing so seems to conflict with some broadly shared and deeply felt intuitions regarding the individuality of responsibility and the relationship between responsibility and guilt. These convictions coincide with some basic ideas in Kantian moral theory and the ascriptive theory that they entail. In this paper, it is shown that the seriousness of the problems to which the proposed responsibilities relate does not seem to leave room for resignation or aloofness. Furthermore, it is shown that the idea of strict liability is compatible with our traditional ways of attributing moral responsibility in more respects than one may think at first sight.
M3 - Chapter
SP - 317
EP - 328
BT - Proceedings for Computer Ethics
A2 - Johnson, D.
A2 - Moor, J.
A2 - Tavani, H.
PB - Dartmouth
CY - Hanover, New Hampshire
ER -