Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation

E. Reuben, S. Suetens

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We propose a novel experimental method that disentangles strategically- and non-strategically-motivated behavior. We apply it to an indefinitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma game to observe simultaneously how the same individual behaves in situations with future interaction and in situations with no future interaction, while controlling for expectations. This method allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the observed pattern of cooperation in experiments with repeated interaction, including the so-called endgame effect. Our results indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)24-43
JournalExperimental Economics
Volume15
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012

Fingerprint

Interaction
Experimental method
Repeated games
Experiment
Prisoner's dilemma game
Repeated prisoner's dilemma
Repeated interaction

Keywords

  • Repeated games
  • Cooperation
  • Reputation building
  • Strong reciprocity

Cite this

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Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation. / Reuben, E.; Suetens, S.

In: Experimental Economics, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2012, p. 24-43.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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AU - Suetens, S.

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