Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game

Cedric Argenton, Ola Andersson, Jörgen W Weibull

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

This paper studies the role of strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game. A player’s uncertainty about another player’s strategy is modeled as an atomless probability distribution over that player’s strategy set. A strategy profile is robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player’s strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others (Andersson et al., 2014). In the context of the Nash demand game, we show that robustness to symmetric (asymmetric) strategic uncertainty singles out the (generalized) Nash bargaining solution. The least uncertain party obtains the bigger share.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-5
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume91
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2018

Fingerprint

uncertainty
Game
Robustness
Uncertainty
demand
Nash Bargaining Solution
Demand
Nash demand game
Strategic uncertainty
Vanish
Probability Distribution
Strategy
Profile

Cite this

Argenton, Cedric ; Andersson, Ola ; Weibull, Jörgen W. / Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game. In: Mathematical Social Sciences. 2018 ; Vol. 91. pp. 1-5.
@article{4f955cae310d479eb4e089578a0bfe85,
title = "Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game",
abstract = "This paper studies the role of strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game. A player’s uncertainty about another player’s strategy is modeled as an atomless probability distribution over that player’s strategy set. A strategy profile is robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player’s strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others (Andersson et al., 2014). In the context of the Nash demand game, we show that robustness to symmetric (asymmetric) strategic uncertainty singles out the (generalized) Nash bargaining solution. The least uncertain party obtains the bigger share.",
author = "Cedric Argenton and Ola Andersson and Weibull, {J{\"o}rgen W}",
year = "2018",
month = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.10.007",
language = "English",
volume = "91",
pages = "1--5",
journal = "Mathematical Social Sciences",
issn = "0165-4896",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game. / Argenton, Cedric; Andersson, Ola; Weibull, Jörgen W.

In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 91, 01.2018, p. 1-5.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game

AU - Argenton, Cedric

AU - Andersson, Ola

AU - Weibull, Jörgen W

PY - 2018/1

Y1 - 2018/1

N2 - This paper studies the role of strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game. A player’s uncertainty about another player’s strategy is modeled as an atomless probability distribution over that player’s strategy set. A strategy profile is robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player’s strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others (Andersson et al., 2014). In the context of the Nash demand game, we show that robustness to symmetric (asymmetric) strategic uncertainty singles out the (generalized) Nash bargaining solution. The least uncertain party obtains the bigger share.

AB - This paper studies the role of strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game. A player’s uncertainty about another player’s strategy is modeled as an atomless probability distribution over that player’s strategy set. A strategy profile is robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player’s strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others (Andersson et al., 2014). In the context of the Nash demand game, we show that robustness to symmetric (asymmetric) strategic uncertainty singles out the (generalized) Nash bargaining solution. The least uncertain party obtains the bigger share.

U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.10.007

DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.10.007

M3 - Article

VL - 91

SP - 1

EP - 5

JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

JF - Mathematical Social Sciences

SN - 0165-4896

ER -