### Abstract

Original language | English |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 1-5 |

Journal | Mathematical Social Sciences |

Volume | 91 |

DOIs | |

Publication status | Published - Jan 2018 |

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### Cite this

*Mathematical Social Sciences*,

*91*, 1-5. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.10.007

}

*Mathematical Social Sciences*, vol. 91, pp. 1-5. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.10.007

**Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game.** / Argenton, Cedric; Andersson, Ola; Weibull, Jörgen W.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game

AU - Argenton, Cedric

AU - Andersson, Ola

AU - Weibull, Jörgen W

PY - 2018/1

Y1 - 2018/1

N2 - This paper studies the role of strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game. A player’s uncertainty about another player’s strategy is modeled as an atomless probability distribution over that player’s strategy set. A strategy profile is robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player’s strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others (Andersson et al., 2014). In the context of the Nash demand game, we show that robustness to symmetric (asymmetric) strategic uncertainty singles out the (generalized) Nash bargaining solution. The least uncertain party obtains the bigger share.

AB - This paper studies the role of strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game. A player’s uncertainty about another player’s strategy is modeled as an atomless probability distribution over that player’s strategy set. A strategy profile is robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player’s strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others (Andersson et al., 2014). In the context of the Nash demand game, we show that robustness to symmetric (asymmetric) strategic uncertainty singles out the (generalized) Nash bargaining solution. The least uncertain party obtains the bigger share.

U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.10.007

DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.10.007

M3 - Article

VL - 91

SP - 1

EP - 5

JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

JF - Mathematical Social Sciences

SN - 0165-4896

ER -