Abstract
Many people who perform paradigmatic examples of acts of supererogation claim that they could not have done otherwise. In this paper I will argue that these self-reports from moral exemplars present a challenge to the traditional view of supererogation as involving agential sacrifice. I will argue that the claims made by moral exemplars are plausibly understood as what Bernard Williams calls a ‘practical necessity’. I will then argue that this makes it implausible to view these acts as involving agential sacrifice.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 105-124 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplementary Volume |
Volume | 77 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2015 |
Keywords
- Supererogation
- Sacrifice
- Moral Saint
- Moral hero
- Moral Philosophy