Screening for Patent Quality: Examination, Fees, and the Courts

Mark Schankerman, Florian Schütt

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

Abstract

We develop an integrated framework to study how governments can improve the
quality of patent screening. We focus on four key policy instruments: patent office examination, pre- and post-grant fees, and challenges in the courts. We show
that there are important complementarities among these instruments, and identify
conditions under which they can be used to achieve either partial or complete
screening. We simulate the model to study the welfare effects of different policy
reforms. We show that intensifying patent office examination, frontloading patent
fees and capping litigation costs all generate welfare gains, while replacing examination with a pure registration system reduces welfare.
LanguageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherDepartment of Economics
Number of pages61
Volume2016-046
Publication statusPublished - 14 Dec 2016

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2016-046

Fingerprint

Screening
Fees
Patent quality
Patents
Welfare effects
Policy instruments
Registration
Integrated
Government
Welfare gains
Litigation costs
Complementarity

Keywords

  • innovation
  • patents
  • screening
  • litigation
  • courts
  • patent fees

Cite this

Schankerman, M., & Schütt, F. (2016). Screening for Patent Quality: Examination, Fees, and the Courts. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2016-046). Tilburg: Department of Economics.
Schankerman, Mark ; Schütt, Florian. / Screening for Patent Quality : Examination, Fees, and the Courts. Tilburg : Department of Economics, 2016. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Schankerman, M & Schütt, F 2016 'Screening for Patent Quality: Examination, Fees, and the Courts' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2016-046, Department of Economics, Tilburg.

Screening for Patent Quality : Examination, Fees, and the Courts. / Schankerman, Mark; Schütt, Florian.

Tilburg : Department of Economics, 2016. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2016-046).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Schankerman M, Schütt F. Screening for Patent Quality: Examination, Fees, and the Courts. Tilburg: Department of Economics. 2016 Dec 14. (CentER Discussion Paper).