Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

Abstract

The market for Internet search is not only economically and socially important, it is also highly concentrated. Is this a problem? We study the question whether "competition is only a free click away". We argue that the market for Internet search is characterized by indirect network externalities and construct a simple model of search engine competition, which produces a market share development that fits the empirically observed development since 2003 well. We find that there is a strong tendency towards market tipping and, subsequently, monopolization, with negative consequences on economic welfare. Therefore, we propose to require search engines to share their data on previous searches. We compare the resulting "competitive oligopoly" market structure with the less competitive current situation and show that our proposal would spur innovation, search quality, consumer surplus, and total welfare. We also discuss the practical feasibility of our policy proposal and sketch the legal issues involved.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherTILEC
Volume2011-024
Publication statusPublished - 2011

Publication series

NameTILEC Discussion Paper
Volume2011-024

Fingerprint

Search engine
Network externalities
World Wide Web
Legal issues
Economic welfare
Innovation
Monopolization
Market structure
Consumer surplus
Market share
Oligopoly

Keywords

  • Search engines
  • network externalities
  • query logs
  • antitrust
  • regulation

Cite this

Argenton, C., & Prüfer, J. (2011). Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities. (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-024). Tilburg: TILEC.
Argenton, C. ; Prüfer, J. / Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities. Tilburg : TILEC, 2011. (TILEC Discussion Paper).
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Argenton, C & Prüfer, J 2011 'Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities' TILEC Discussion Paper, vol. 2011-024, TILEC, Tilburg.

Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities. / Argenton, C.; Prüfer, J.

Tilburg : TILEC, 2011. (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-024).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities

AU - Argenton, C.

AU - Prüfer, J.

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - The market for Internet search is not only economically and socially important, it is also highly concentrated. Is this a problem? We study the question whether "competition is only a free click away". We argue that the market for Internet search is characterized by indirect network externalities and construct a simple model of search engine competition, which produces a market share development that fits the empirically observed development since 2003 well. We find that there is a strong tendency towards market tipping and, subsequently, monopolization, with negative consequences on economic welfare. Therefore, we propose to require search engines to share their data on previous searches. We compare the resulting "competitive oligopoly" market structure with the less competitive current situation and show that our proposal would spur innovation, search quality, consumer surplus, and total welfare. We also discuss the practical feasibility of our policy proposal and sketch the legal issues involved.

AB - The market for Internet search is not only economically and socially important, it is also highly concentrated. Is this a problem? We study the question whether "competition is only a free click away". We argue that the market for Internet search is characterized by indirect network externalities and construct a simple model of search engine competition, which produces a market share development that fits the empirically observed development since 2003 well. We find that there is a strong tendency towards market tipping and, subsequently, monopolization, with negative consequences on economic welfare. Therefore, we propose to require search engines to share their data on previous searches. We compare the resulting "competitive oligopoly" market structure with the less competitive current situation and show that our proposal would spur innovation, search quality, consumer surplus, and total welfare. We also discuss the practical feasibility of our policy proposal and sketch the legal issues involved.

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KW - query logs

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Argenton C, Prüfer J. Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities. Tilburg: TILEC. 2011. (TILEC Discussion Paper).