Self-serving Incentives of Managers

Research output: Working paperOther research output

Abstract

In many organizational contexts, managers might have self-serving incentives whereby giving high evaluations to employees comes at the expense of their own payoff. In this study, I examine the impact of managers’ self-serving incentives on the collection and use of information for the purpose of subjective performance evaluation. I find that managers with self-serving incentives collect less information than managers with no self-serving incentives. When managers do collect all available information, I find that managers with self-serving incentives interpret that information in a more self-interested way by giving lower upward adjustments to employees’ compensation than do managers with no self-serving incentives. However, information avoidance under self-serving incentives is mitigated when employees propose self-adjustments and managers observe these self-adjustments afterwards. My findings increase our knowledge about the role of subjective performance evaluations in modern organizational contexts where managers might have self-serving incentives, such as business units operating as profit centers and profit-accountable teams.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages42
Publication statusIn preparation - Sep 2019

Fingerprint

Managers
Incentives
Organizational context
Employees
Profit
Performance evaluation
Avoidance
Expenses
Evaluation
Employee compensation

Keywords

  • Self-serving incentives
  • Information collection
  • Information interpretation
  • Employee self-adjustments
  • Subjective performance evaluation

Cite this

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title = "Self-serving Incentives of Managers",
abstract = "In many organizational contexts, managers might have self-serving incentives whereby giving high evaluations to employees comes at the expense of their own payoff. In this study, I examine the impact of managers’ self-serving incentives on the collection and use of information for the purpose of subjective performance evaluation. I find that managers with self-serving incentives collect less information than managers with no self-serving incentives. When managers do collect all available information, I find that managers with self-serving incentives interpret that information in a more self-interested way by giving lower upward adjustments to employees’ compensation than do managers with no self-serving incentives. However, information avoidance under self-serving incentives is mitigated when employees propose self-adjustments and managers observe these self-adjustments afterwards. My findings increase our knowledge about the role of subjective performance evaluations in modern organizational contexts where managers might have self-serving incentives, such as business units operating as profit centers and profit-accountable teams.",
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Self-serving Incentives of Managers. / Arshad, Farah.

2019.

Research output: Working paperOther research output

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AB - In many organizational contexts, managers might have self-serving incentives whereby giving high evaluations to employees comes at the expense of their own payoff. In this study, I examine the impact of managers’ self-serving incentives on the collection and use of information for the purpose of subjective performance evaluation. I find that managers with self-serving incentives collect less information than managers with no self-serving incentives. When managers do collect all available information, I find that managers with self-serving incentives interpret that information in a more self-interested way by giving lower upward adjustments to employees’ compensation than do managers with no self-serving incentives. However, information avoidance under self-serving incentives is mitigated when employees propose self-adjustments and managers observe these self-adjustments afterwards. My findings increase our knowledge about the role of subjective performance evaluations in modern organizational contexts where managers might have self-serving incentives, such as business units operating as profit centers and profit-accountable teams.

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