@techreport{38f414c1bc9245658ba6d3643e456cc0,
title = "Sender-Receiver Games",
abstract = "Standard game-theoretic solution concepts do not guarantee meaningful commu- nication in cheap-talk games. In this paper, we define a solution concept which guarantees communication for a large class of games by designing a behavior pro- tocol which the receiver uses to judge messages sent by the sender on acceptability. For that, we will make use of the Nash equilibrium concept for which truth-telling is a consequence. Uniqueness is nevertheless not a consequence, but after reasonable selection it is. Further, we will come to a method to compute all equilibria very easily.",
keywords = "Noncooperative game theory, signalling, sender-receiver games",
author = "R.J.A.P. Peeters and J.A.M. Potters",
note = "Pagination: 18",
year = "1999",
language = "English",
volume = "1999-46",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Econometrics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Econometrics",
}