Sender-Receiver Games

R.J.A.P. Peeters, J.A.M. Potters

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Abstract

Standard game-theoretic solution concepts do not guarantee meaningful commu- nication in cheap-talk games. In this paper, we define a solution concept which guarantees communication for a large class of games by designing a behavior pro- tocol which the receiver uses to judge messages sent by the sender on acceptability. For that, we will make use of the Nash equilibrium concept for which truth-telling is a consequence. Uniqueness is nevertheless not a consequence, but after reasonable selection it is. Further, we will come to a method to compute all equilibria very easily.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconometrics
Number of pages18
Volume1999-46
Publication statusPublished - 1999

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1999-46

Keywords

  • Noncooperative game theory
  • signalling
  • sender-receiver games

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  • Cite this

    Peeters, R. J. A. P., & Potters, J. A. M. (1999). Sender-Receiver Games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1999-46). Econometrics.