Sequentially Stable Coalition Structures

Y. Funaki, T. Yamato

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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    Abstract

    In this paper, we examine the question of which coalition structures farsighted players form in coalition formation games with externalities. We introduce a stability concept for a coalition structure called a sequentially stable coalition structure. Our concept of domination between two coalition structures is based on a “step-by-step” approach to describe negotiation steps concretely by restricting how coalition structures can change: when one coalition structure is changed to another one, either (i) only one merging of two separate coalitions into a coalition occurs, or (ii) only one breaking up of a coalition into two separate coalitions happens. As applications of our stability notion, we show that the efficient grand coalition structure can be sequentially stable in simple partition function form games and common pool resource games.
    Original languageEnglish
    Place of PublicationTilburg
    PublisherVakgroep CentER
    Number of pages24
    Volume2007-96
    Publication statusPublished - 2007

    Publication series

    NameCentER Discussion Paper
    Volume2007-96

    Fingerprint

    Coalition structure
    Coalition formation
    Game form
    Merging
    Common pool resources
    Externalities
    Domination

    Cite this

    Funaki, Y., & Yamato, T. (2007). Sequentially Stable Coalition Structures. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2007-96). Tilburg: Vakgroep CentER.
    Funaki, Y. ; Yamato, T. / Sequentially Stable Coalition Structures. Tilburg : Vakgroep CentER, 2007. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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    abstract = "In this paper, we examine the question of which coalition structures farsighted players form in coalition formation games with externalities. We introduce a stability concept for a coalition structure called a sequentially stable coalition structure. Our concept of domination between two coalition structures is based on a “step-by-step” approach to describe negotiation steps concretely by restricting how coalition structures can change: when one coalition structure is changed to another one, either (i) only one merging of two separate coalitions into a coalition occurs, or (ii) only one breaking up of a coalition into two separate coalitions happens. As applications of our stability notion, we show that the efficient grand coalition structure can be sequentially stable in simple partition function form games and common pool resource games.",
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    Funaki, Y & Yamato, T 2007 'Sequentially Stable Coalition Structures' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2007-96, Vakgroep CentER, Tilburg.

    Sequentially Stable Coalition Structures. / Funaki, Y.; Yamato, T.

    Tilburg : Vakgroep CentER, 2007. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2007-96).

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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    Funaki Y, Yamato T. Sequentially Stable Coalition Structures. Tilburg: Vakgroep CentER. 2007. (CentER Discussion Paper).