@inbook{e491ce424565407eb193271db5c3e591,
title = "Serial takeovers, large shareholders, and CEOs{\textquoteright} equity-based compensation",
abstract = "In this chapter we investigate how the structure of a CEO{\textquoteright}s compensation package – and especially his bonus and equity-based compensation (EBC) – influences his M & A decisions. We find that a CEO with a higher proportion of EBC is more likely to initiate (serial) acquisitions. Likewise, a CEO who receives a larger bonus is more eager to be involved in takeovers. We argue that equity-based compensation along with strong performance requirements (stock options and restricted stock become vested only if specific performance criteria are met) induce managers to adopt aggressive growth strategies through M & As. Large outside shareholders reduce a firm{\textquoteright}s takeover activity, which is also the case when a CEO holds a significant equity stake.",
author = "E.S. Pikulina and L.D.R. Renneboog",
year = "2015",
month = jul,
day = "31",
doi = "10.4337/9781782546856.00028",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781782546849",
series = "Research Handbooks in Corporate Law and Governance Series",
publisher = "Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.",
pages = "297--318",
editor = "J. Hill and R. Thomas",
booktitle = "The Research Handbook on Shareholder Power",
address = "United Kingdom",
}