Set-valued solution concepts using interval-type payoffs for interval games

S.Z. Alparslan-Gok, O. Branzei, R. Brânzei, S.H. Tijs

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Uncertainty is a daily presence in the real world. It affects our decision making and may have influence on cooperation. Often uncertainty is so severe that we can only predict some upper and lower bounds for the outcome of our actions, i.e., payoffs lie in some intervals. A suitable game theoretic model to support decision making in collaborative situations with interval data is that of cooperative interval games. Solution concepts that associate with each cooperative interval game sets of interval allocations with appealing properties provide a natural way to capture the uncertainty of coalition values into the players’ payoffs. In this paper, some set-valued solution concepts using interval payoffs, namely the interval core, the interval dominance core and the interval stable sets for cooperative interval games, are introduced and studied. The main results contained in the paper are a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the interval core of a cooperative interval game and the relations between the interval core, the interval dominance core and the interval stable sets of such a game.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)621-626
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume47
Issue number4-5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011

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Solution Concepts
Game
Interval
Decision making
Stable Set
Uncertainty
Solution concepts
Decision Making
Interval Data
Coalitions
Upper and Lower Bounds

Cite this

Alparslan-Gok, S.Z. ; Branzei, O. ; Brânzei, R. ; Tijs, S.H. / Set-valued solution concepts using interval-type payoffs for interval games. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. 2011 ; Vol. 47, No. 4-5. pp. 621-626.
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Set-valued solution concepts using interval-type payoffs for interval games. / Alparslan-Gok, S.Z.; Branzei, O.; Brânzei, R.; Tijs, S.H.

In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 47, No. 4-5, 2011, p. 621-626.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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