@techreport{c7482a22cb73428b9cc0ea6723552db1,
title = "Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders",
abstract = "This paper analyzes the problem of selling a number of indivisible items to a set of unitdemand bidders. An ascending auction mechanism called the Excess Demand Ascending Auction (EDAA) is defined. The main results demonstrate that EDAA terminates in a finite number of iterations and that the exact auction mechanism in Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (J. Polit. Economy 94: 863–872, 1986) and its modification based on the Ford- Fulkerson method, proposed by Sankaran (Math. Soc. Sci. 28: 143–150, 1994), reduce to special cases of EDAA.",
keywords = "Multi-item auction, Unit-demand bidders, Excess demand, Algorithms",
author = "T.D. Andersson and C. Andersson and A.J.J. Talman",
note = "Pagination: 17",
year = "2010",
language = "English",
volume = "2010-51",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Operations research",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Operations research",
}