Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders

T.D. Andersson, C. Andersson, A.J.J. Talman

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the problem of selling a number of indivisible items to a set of unitdemand bidders. An ascending auction mechanism called the Excess Demand Ascending Auction (EDAA) is defined. The main results demonstrate that EDAA terminates in a finite number of iterations and that the exact auction mechanism in Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (J. Polit. Economy 94: 863–872, 1986) and its modification based on the Ford- Fulkerson method, proposed by Sankaran (Math. Soc. Sci. 28: 143–150, 1994), reduce to special cases of EDAA.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherOperations research
Number of pages17
Volume2010-51
Publication statusPublished - 2010

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2010-51

Keywords

  • Multi-item auction
  • Unit-demand bidders
  • Excess demand
  • Algorithms

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