Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders

T. Andersson, C. Andersson, A.J.J. Talman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called “sets in excess demand” is introduced, and the main result demonstrates that a simple ascending auction always terminates at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices if and only if the selection belongs to this family.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)27-36
JournalAnnals of Operations Research
Volume211
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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