Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders

T. Andersson; C. Andersson; A.J.J. Talman

doi:10.1007%2fs10479-013-1344-1

Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders

T. Andersson, C. Andersson, A.J.J. Talman

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called “sets in excess demand” is introduced, and the main result demonstrates that a simple ascending auction always terminates at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices if and only if the selection belongs to this family.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	27-36
Journal	Annals of Operations Research
Volume	211
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007%2fs10479-013-1344-1
Publication status	Published - 2013

Access to Document

10.1007%2fs10479-013-1344-1

Cite this

@article{e12370f793bf44d0a9c620d3cd74e823,

title = "Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders",

abstract = "This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called “sets in excess demand” is introduced, and the main result demonstrates that a simple ascending auction always terminates at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices if and only if the selection belongs to this family.",

author = "T. Andersson and C. Andersson and A.J.J. Talman",

year = "2013",

doi = "10.1007%2fs10479-013-1344-1",

language = "English",

volume = "211",

pages = "27--36",

journal = "Annals of Operations Research",

issn = "0254-5330",

publisher = "Springer",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders

AU - Andersson, T.

AU - Andersson, C.

AU - Talman, A.J.J.

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called “sets in excess demand” is introduced, and the main result demonstrates that a simple ascending auction always terminates at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices if and only if the selection belongs to this family.

AB - This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called “sets in excess demand” is introduced, and the main result demonstrates that a simple ascending auction always terminates at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices if and only if the selection belongs to this family.

U2 - 10.1007%2fs10479-013-1344-1

DO - 10.1007%2fs10479-013-1344-1

M3 - Article

SN - 0254-5330

VL - 211

SP - 27

EP - 36

JO - Annals of Operations Research

JF - Annals of Operations Research

IS - 1

ER -

Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders

Abstract

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this