Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Tilburg |
| Publisher | Finance |
| Number of pages | 50 |
| Volume | 2005-115 |
| Publication status | Published - 2005 |
Publication series
| Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
|---|---|
| Volume | 2005-115 |
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Keywords
- shareholders
- venture capital
- lock-in agreements
- lock-up contracts
- lock-in expiry
- lock-up expiry
- signaling
- underwriter reputation
- underpricing
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Shareholder Lock-In Contracts : Share Price and Trading Volume Effects at the Lock-In Expiry. / Angenandt, P.P.; Goergen, M.; Renneboog, L.D.R.
Tilburg : Finance, 2005. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2005-115).Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper › Other research output
TY - UNPB
T1 - Shareholder Lock-In Contracts
T2 - Share Price and Trading Volume Effects at the Lock-In Expiry
AU - Angenandt, P.P.
AU - Goergen, M.
AU - Renneboog, L.D.R.
N1 - Pagination: 50
PY - 2005
Y1 - 2005
N2 - This paper unveils the diversity in lock-in agreements of firms listed on the Nouveau Marche stock exchange in France.We give the main economic reasons why shareholders adopt lock-in agreements that are more stringent than legally required.We relate the abnormal returns and the abnormal volume at the expiry dates of the different types of lock-in contracts to the degree of underpricing, venture-capitalist reputation and underwriter reputation.Abnormal returns and trading volume increase at the lock-in expiry; this is especially pronounced at the expiry dates of insider lock-in contracts as insiders are legally required to be locked-in.We do not find significant abnormal returns at the expiries of VC contracts, even though trading volume increases at their lock-in expiry.There is also no evidence of a positive (negative) relation between abnormal returns (abnormal volume) and more stringent lock-in contracts.Lock-in contracts and the degree of underpricing are complementary signalling devices.
AB - This paper unveils the diversity in lock-in agreements of firms listed on the Nouveau Marche stock exchange in France.We give the main economic reasons why shareholders adopt lock-in agreements that are more stringent than legally required.We relate the abnormal returns and the abnormal volume at the expiry dates of the different types of lock-in contracts to the degree of underpricing, venture-capitalist reputation and underwriter reputation.Abnormal returns and trading volume increase at the lock-in expiry; this is especially pronounced at the expiry dates of insider lock-in contracts as insiders are legally required to be locked-in.We do not find significant abnormal returns at the expiries of VC contracts, even though trading volume increases at their lock-in expiry.There is also no evidence of a positive (negative) relation between abnormal returns (abnormal volume) and more stringent lock-in contracts.Lock-in contracts and the degree of underpricing are complementary signalling devices.
KW - shareholders
KW - venture capital
KW - lock-in agreements
KW - lock-up contracts
KW - lock-in expiry
KW - lock-up expiry
KW - signaling
KW - underwriter reputation
KW - underpricing
M3 - Discussion paper
VL - 2005-115
T3 - CentER Discussion Paper
BT - Shareholder Lock-In Contracts
PB - Finance
CY - Tilburg
ER -