@techreport{2ab886e543c34bed98fe33d5c88f7afd,
title = "Shareholder Lock-In Contracts: Share Price and Trading Volume Effects at the Lock-In Expiry",
abstract = "This paper unveils the diversity in lock-in agreements of firms listed on the Nouveau Marche stock exchange in France.We give the main economic reasons why shareholders adopt lock-in agreements that are more stringent than legally required.We relate the abnormal returns and the abnormal volume at the expiry dates of the different types of lock-in contracts to the degree of underpricing, venture-capitalist reputation and underwriter reputation.Abnormal returns and trading volume increase at the lock-in expiry; this is especially pronounced at the expiry dates of insider lock-in contracts as insiders are legally required to be locked-in.We do not find significant abnormal returns at the expiries of VC contracts, even though trading volume increases at their lock-in expiry.There is also no evidence of a positive (negative) relation between abnormal returns (abnormal volume) and more stringent lock-in contracts.Lock-in contracts and the degree of underpricing are complementary signalling devices.",
keywords = "shareholders, venture capital, lock-in agreements, lock-up contracts, lock-in expiry, lock-up expiry, signaling, underwriter reputation, underpricing",
author = "P.P. Angenandt and M. Goergen and L.D.R. Renneboog",
note = "Pagination: 50",
year = "2005",
language = "English",
volume = "2005-115",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Finance",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Finance",
}