Signaling Without Common Prior: An Experiment

M. Drouvelis, W. Müller, A. Possajennikov

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender’s type, the long-run behavior without an induced common prior is shown to be different from the behavior when a common prior is induced, while for other distributions behavior is similar under both regimes. We also present a learning model that allows players to learn about the other players’ strategies and the prior distribution of the sender’s type. We show that this learning model accurately accounts for all main features of the data.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages29
Volume2009-28
Publication statusPublished - 2009

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2009-28

Fingerprint

Experiment
Common priors
Learning model
Common prior assumption
Probability distribution
Signaling games
Incomplete information
Game-theoretic models

Keywords

  • common prior
  • signaling
  • experiment
  • learning

Cite this

Drouvelis, M., Müller, W., & Possajennikov, A. (2009). Signaling Without Common Prior: An Experiment. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2009-28). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Drouvelis, M. ; Müller, W. ; Possajennikov, A. / Signaling Without Common Prior : An Experiment. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2009. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Drouvelis, M, Müller, W & Possajennikov, A 2009 'Signaling Without Common Prior: An Experiment' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2009-28, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

Signaling Without Common Prior : An Experiment. / Drouvelis, M.; Müller, W.; Possajennikov, A.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2009. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2009-28).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Drouvelis M, Müller W, Possajennikov A. Signaling Without Common Prior: An Experiment. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 2009. (CentER Discussion Paper).