Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games

D.A. Dimitrov, P.E.M. Borm, R.L.P. Hendrickx, S.C. Sung

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

265 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy.Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered.It turns out that the first domain restriction guarantees non-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic games.Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard.We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions and some su.cient conditions for non-emptiness of the core already known in the literature.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherOperations research
Number of pages27
Volume2004-5
Publication statusPublished - 2004

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2004-5

Keywords

  • core
  • stability
  • games

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this

    Dimitrov, D. A., Borm, P. E. M., Hendrickx, R. L. P., & Sung, S. C. (2004). Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2004-5). Operations research.