Social Network Formation with Consent

R.P. Gilles, S. Sarangi

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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    Abstract

    We investigate the equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation that are based on individual actions only.Our approach is grounded in three simple and realistic principles: (1) Link formation should be a binary process of consent.(2) Link formation should be costly.(3) The class of network payoff functions should be as general as possible.It is accepted that these consent models have a very large number of equilibria.However, until now no characterization of these equilibria has been established in the literature.We aim to fill this void and provide characterizations of stable networks or the cases of two-sided and one-sided link formation costs.Furthermore, we provide a comparison of Nash equilibria with potential maximizers for a certain specification.
    Original languageEnglish
    Place of PublicationTilburg
    PublisherVakgroep CentER
    Number of pages27
    Volume2004-70
    Publication statusPublished - 2004

    Publication series

    NameCentER Discussion Paper
    Volume2004-70

    Fingerprint

    social network
    void
    cost

    Keywords

    • game theory
    • general equilibrium

    Cite this

    Gilles, R. P., & Sarangi, S. (2004). Social Network Formation with Consent. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2004-70). Tilburg: Vakgroep CentER.
    Gilles, R.P. ; Sarangi, S. / Social Network Formation with Consent. Tilburg : Vakgroep CentER, 2004. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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    abstract = "We investigate the equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation that are based on individual actions only.Our approach is grounded in three simple and realistic principles: (1) Link formation should be a binary process of consent.(2) Link formation should be costly.(3) The class of network payoff functions should be as general as possible.It is accepted that these consent models have a very large number of equilibria.However, until now no characterization of these equilibria has been established in the literature.We aim to fill this void and provide characterizations of stable networks or the cases of two-sided and one-sided link formation costs.Furthermore, we provide a comparison of Nash equilibria with potential maximizers for a certain specification.",
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    Gilles, RP & Sarangi, S 2004 'Social Network Formation with Consent' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2004-70, Vakgroep CentER, Tilburg.

    Social Network Formation with Consent. / Gilles, R.P.; Sarangi, S.

    Tilburg : Vakgroep CentER, 2004. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2004-70).

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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    T1 - Social Network Formation with Consent

    AU - Gilles, R.P.

    AU - Sarangi, S.

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    PY - 2004

    Y1 - 2004

    N2 - We investigate the equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation that are based on individual actions only.Our approach is grounded in three simple and realistic principles: (1) Link formation should be a binary process of consent.(2) Link formation should be costly.(3) The class of network payoff functions should be as general as possible.It is accepted that these consent models have a very large number of equilibria.However, until now no characterization of these equilibria has been established in the literature.We aim to fill this void and provide characterizations of stable networks or the cases of two-sided and one-sided link formation costs.Furthermore, we provide a comparison of Nash equilibria with potential maximizers for a certain specification.

    AB - We investigate the equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation that are based on individual actions only.Our approach is grounded in three simple and realistic principles: (1) Link formation should be a binary process of consent.(2) Link formation should be costly.(3) The class of network payoff functions should be as general as possible.It is accepted that these consent models have a very large number of equilibria.However, until now no characterization of these equilibria has been established in the literature.We aim to fill this void and provide characterizations of stable networks or the cases of two-sided and one-sided link formation costs.Furthermore, we provide a comparison of Nash equilibria with potential maximizers for a certain specification.

    KW - game theory

    KW - general equilibrium

    M3 - Discussion paper

    VL - 2004-70

    T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

    BT - Social Network Formation with Consent

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    Gilles RP, Sarangi S. Social Network Formation with Consent. Tilburg: Vakgroep CentER. 2004. (CentER Discussion Paper).