Social Preference in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments

A. Riedl, J. Vyrastekova

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Abstract

We study social preferences in a three-person ultimatum game experiment with one proposer and two responders.Any responder can unilaterally punish the proposer.In three treatments, we vary the pecuniary consequences of rejection in such a way that upon rejection of one responder the other responder is (i) affected negatively, (ii) not affected, and (iii) positively affected.We collect complete strategies and are able to classify (almost) all of them in intuitively plausible strategy types.Half of the responders submitted strategies that are sensitive to the relative standing with respect to the proposer and the other responder.The other half of responders submitted strategies with an acceptance threshold concerning the own material payoff, only.Moreover, we observe a treatment effect.A responder is more likely to reject a proposal if this does not negatively affect his relative standing with respect to the other responder. Recently developed models of social preferences are not able to organize our data.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages33
Volume2002-5
Publication statusPublished - 2002

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2002-5

Keywords

  • game theory
  • preferences

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    Riedl, A., & Vyrastekova, J. (2002). Social Preference in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2002-5). Microeconomics.