Social rationalizability with mediation

P. Jean Jacques Herings*, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


We propose a solution concept for social environments called social rationalizability with mediation that identifies the consequences of common knowledge of rationality and farsightedness. In a social environment several coalitions may and could be willing to move at the same time. Individuals not only hold conjectures about the behaviors of other individuals but also about how a mediator is going to solve conflicts of interest. The set of socially rationalizable outcomes with mediation is shown to be non-empty for all social environments, and it can be computed by an iterative reduction procedure. We show that social rationalizability with mediation does not necessarily satisfy coalitional rationality when the number of coalition members is greater than two.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)440-461
JournalDynamic Games and Applications
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2023


  • Coalitional rationality
  • Mediation
  • Rationalizability
  • Social environments


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