Solutions for cooperative games with and without transferable utility

T. Suzuki

Research output: ThesisDoctoral Thesis

825 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

When individuals generate benefits from their cooperation, allocation
problems may occur regarding how much of the benefit from the
cooperation each individual should take. In many economic situations,
defining the contribution of each individual in a fair way is essential. This
thesis is on cooperative game theory, a mathematical tool that models
and analyses cooperative situations between individuals. Throughout
the monograph, allocation rules that are based on the contributions of
individuals are studied.

The first two parts of this thesis are on the class of transferable utility
games, in which benefits from cooperation can be freely transferred
between agents. In the first part, allocation rules when the cooperation
between agents is restricted by a communication structure are studied.
A chapter of this part gives a new characterization of a known allocation
rule. In the next chapter, allocation rules are investigated for the class of
games in which the underlying communication structure is represented
by a circle. The second part of this thesis introduces a new type of
restriction on cooperation between players, called quasi-building system,
which covers many known structures. The third part of this thesis deals
with situations in which benefits from cooperation are not transferable
between individuals. This part focuses on when an allocation rule based
on contributions of individuals leads to an economically satisfying result.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • Tilburg University
Supervisors/Advisors
  • Talman, A.J.J., Promotor
  • Koshevoy, G.A., Co-promotor, External person
Award date20 Feb 2015
Place of PublicationTilburg
Publisher
Print ISBNs9789056684297
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Fingerprint

Allocation rules
Cooperative game
Transferable utility
Communication structure
Economics
Cooperative game theory

Cite this

Suzuki, T. (2015). Solutions for cooperative games with and without transferable utility. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Suzuki, T.. / Solutions for cooperative games with and without transferable utility. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2015. 112 p.
@phdthesis{9bd876f2c0554d0195f0cfc969c49cda,
title = "Solutions for cooperative games with and without transferable utility",
abstract = "When individuals generate benefits from their cooperation, allocationproblems may occur regarding how much of the benefit from thecooperation each individual should take. In many economic situations,defining the contribution of each individual in a fair way is essential. Thisthesis is on cooperative game theory, a mathematical tool that modelsand analyses cooperative situations between individuals. Throughoutthe monograph, allocation rules that are based on the contributions ofindividuals are studied.The first two parts of this thesis are on the class of transferable utilitygames, in which benefits from cooperation can be freely transferredbetween agents. In the first part, allocation rules when the cooperationbetween agents is restricted by a communication structure are studied.A chapter of this part gives a new characterization of a known allocationrule. In the next chapter, allocation rules are investigated for the class ofgames in which the underlying communication structure is representedby a circle. The second part of this thesis introduces a new type ofrestriction on cooperation between players, called quasi-building system,which covers many known structures. The third part of this thesis dealswith situations in which benefits from cooperation are not transferablebetween individuals. This part focuses on when an allocation rule basedon contributions of individuals leads to an economically satisfying result.",
author = "T. Suzuki",
year = "2015",
language = "English",
isbn = "9789056684297",
series = "CentER Dissertation Series",
publisher = "CentER, Center for Economic Research",
school = "Tilburg University",

}

Suzuki, T 2015, 'Solutions for cooperative games with and without transferable utility', Doctor of Philosophy, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Solutions for cooperative games with and without transferable utility. / Suzuki, T.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2015. 112 p.

Research output: ThesisDoctoral Thesis

TY - THES

T1 - Solutions for cooperative games with and without transferable utility

AU - Suzuki, T.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - When individuals generate benefits from their cooperation, allocationproblems may occur regarding how much of the benefit from thecooperation each individual should take. In many economic situations,defining the contribution of each individual in a fair way is essential. Thisthesis is on cooperative game theory, a mathematical tool that modelsand analyses cooperative situations between individuals. Throughoutthe monograph, allocation rules that are based on the contributions ofindividuals are studied.The first two parts of this thesis are on the class of transferable utilitygames, in which benefits from cooperation can be freely transferredbetween agents. In the first part, allocation rules when the cooperationbetween agents is restricted by a communication structure are studied.A chapter of this part gives a new characterization of a known allocationrule. In the next chapter, allocation rules are investigated for the class ofgames in which the underlying communication structure is representedby a circle. The second part of this thesis introduces a new type ofrestriction on cooperation between players, called quasi-building system,which covers many known structures. The third part of this thesis dealswith situations in which benefits from cooperation are not transferablebetween individuals. This part focuses on when an allocation rule basedon contributions of individuals leads to an economically satisfying result.

AB - When individuals generate benefits from their cooperation, allocationproblems may occur regarding how much of the benefit from thecooperation each individual should take. In many economic situations,defining the contribution of each individual in a fair way is essential. Thisthesis is on cooperative game theory, a mathematical tool that modelsand analyses cooperative situations between individuals. Throughoutthe monograph, allocation rules that are based on the contributions ofindividuals are studied.The first two parts of this thesis are on the class of transferable utilitygames, in which benefits from cooperation can be freely transferredbetween agents. In the first part, allocation rules when the cooperationbetween agents is restricted by a communication structure are studied.A chapter of this part gives a new characterization of a known allocationrule. In the next chapter, allocation rules are investigated for the class ofgames in which the underlying communication structure is representedby a circle. The second part of this thesis introduces a new type ofrestriction on cooperation between players, called quasi-building system,which covers many known structures. The third part of this thesis dealswith situations in which benefits from cooperation are not transferablebetween individuals. This part focuses on when an allocation rule basedon contributions of individuals leads to an economically satisfying result.

M3 - Doctoral Thesis

SN - 9789056684297

T3 - CentER Dissertation Series

PB - CentER, Center for Economic Research

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Suzuki T. Solutions for cooperative games with and without transferable utility. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2015. 112 p. (CentER Dissertation Series).