Solutions for cooperative games with and without transferable utility

When individuals generate benefits from their cooperation, allocation
problems may occur regarding how much of the benefit from the
cooperation each individual should take. In many economic situations,
defining the contribution of each individual in a fair way is essential. This
thesis is on cooperative game theory, a mathematical tool that models
and analyses cooperative situations between individuals. Throughout
the monograph, allocation rules that are based on the contributions of
individuals are studied.

The first two parts of this thesis are on the class of transferable utility
games, in which benefits from cooperation can be freely transferred
between agents. In the first part, allocation rules when the cooperation
between agents is restricted by a communication structure are studied.
A chapter of this part gives a new characterization of a known allocation
rule. In the next chapter, allocation rules are investigated for the class of
games in which the underlying communication structure is represented
by a circle. The second part of this thesis introduces a new type of
restriction on cooperation between players, called quasi-building system,
which covers many known structures. The third part of this thesis deals
with situations in which benefits from cooperation are not transferable
between individuals. This part focuses on when an allocation rule based
on contributions of individuals leads to an economically satisfying result.