Sophisticated Players and Sophisticated Agents

A. Rustichini

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Abstract

A sophisticated player is an individual who takes the action of the opponents, in a strategic situation, as determined by decision of rational opponents, and acts accordingly. A sophisticated agent is rational in the choice of his action, but ignores the fact that he is part of a strategic situation. We discuss a notion of equilibrium with sophisticated agents, we provide conditions for its existence, and argue that it differs systematically from the Nash equilibrium.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages26
Volume1998-110
Publication statusPublished - 1998

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1998-110

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Nash equilibrium

Keywords

  • Procedural rationality
  • sophisticated agents

Cite this

Rustichini, A. (1998). Sophisticated Players and Sophisticated Agents. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1998-110). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Rustichini, A. / Sophisticated Players and Sophisticated Agents. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 1998. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Rustichini, A 1998 'Sophisticated Players and Sophisticated Agents' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1998-110, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

Sophisticated Players and Sophisticated Agents. / Rustichini, A.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 1998. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1998-110).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Rustichini A. Sophisticated Players and Sophisticated Agents. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 1998. (CentER Discussion Paper).