Spatial competition with intermediated matching

C.L.J.P. van Raalte, H.M. Webers

Research output: Book/ReportReportProfessional

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the spatial competition in commission fees between two match makers. These match makers serve as middlemen between buyers and sellers who are located uniformly on a circle. The profits of the match makers are determined by their respective market sizes. A limited willingness to pay is incorporated by means of reservation prices. If the fraction of buyers and sellers is unequal, the match makers are willing to subsidize the short side of the market, while the long side is exploited completely, provided reservation prices are sufficiently high. Competition is then concentrated entirely on the short side. When reservation prices are low, two local monopolies will emerge.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherUnknown Publisher
Number of pages23
VolumeFEW 702
Publication statusPublished - 1995

Publication series

NameResearch memorandum / Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
VolumeFEW 702

Fingerprint

Spatial competition
Reservation price
Seller
Buyers
Middlemen
Willingness-to-pay
Monopoly
Profit
Fees
Market size

Keywords

  • Matching
  • Price Competition
  • Intermediation
  • Microeconometrics
  • microeconomics

Cite this

van Raalte, C. L. J. P., & Webers, H. M. (1995). Spatial competition with intermediated matching. (Research memorandum / Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; Vol. FEW 702). Unknown Publisher.
van Raalte, C.L.J.P. ; Webers, H.M. / Spatial competition with intermediated matching. Unknown Publisher, 1995. 23 p. (Research memorandum / Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration).
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van Raalte, CLJP & Webers, HM 1995, Spatial competition with intermediated matching. Research memorandum / Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. FEW 702, vol. FEW 702, Unknown Publisher.

Spatial competition with intermediated matching. / van Raalte, C.L.J.P.; Webers, H.M.

Unknown Publisher, 1995. 23 p. (Research memorandum / Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; Vol. FEW 702).

Research output: Book/ReportReportProfessional

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KW - Microeconometrics

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van Raalte CLJP, Webers HM. Spatial competition with intermediated matching. Unknown Publisher, 1995. 23 p. (Research memorandum / Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration).