Stable Economic Cooperation: A Relational Approach

R.P. Gilles, E.A. Lazarova, P.H.M. Ruys

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

206 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We consider a relational economy in which economic agents participate in three types of relational economic activities: autarkic activities; binary matching activities; and plural cooperative activities. We introduce a stability notion and characterize stable interaction structures, both in the absence of externalities from cooperation as well as in the presence of size-based externalities. It is shown that institutional elements such as the emergence of socio-economic roles and organizations based on hierarchical leadership structures support and promote stable economic development.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages47
Volume2008-25
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2008-25

Fingerprint

Economic cooperation
Externalities
Economic development
Socio-economics
Economics
Economic activity
Interaction

Keywords

  • Cooperatives
  • Networks
  • Clubs
  • Relational economies
  • Stable matchings

Cite this

Gilles, R. P., Lazarova, E. A., & Ruys, P. H. M. (2008). Stable Economic Cooperation: A Relational Approach. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2008-25). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Gilles, R.P. ; Lazarova, E.A. ; Ruys, P.H.M. / Stable Economic Cooperation : A Relational Approach. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2008. (CentER Discussion Paper).
@techreport{016d566b7c534030943e812ec86f70c3,
title = "Stable Economic Cooperation: A Relational Approach",
abstract = "We consider a relational economy in which economic agents participate in three types of relational economic activities: autarkic activities; binary matching activities; and plural cooperative activities. We introduce a stability notion and characterize stable interaction structures, both in the absence of externalities from cooperation as well as in the presence of size-based externalities. It is shown that institutional elements such as the emergence of socio-economic roles and organizations based on hierarchical leadership structures support and promote stable economic development.",
keywords = "Cooperatives, Networks, Clubs, Relational economies, Stable matchings",
author = "R.P. Gilles and E.A. Lazarova and P.H.M. Ruys",
note = "Pagination: 47",
year = "2008",
language = "English",
volume = "2008-25",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Microeconomics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Microeconomics",

}

Gilles, RP, Lazarova, EA & Ruys, PHM 2008 'Stable Economic Cooperation: A Relational Approach' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2008-25, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

Stable Economic Cooperation : A Relational Approach. / Gilles, R.P.; Lazarova, E.A.; Ruys, P.H.M.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2008. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2008-25).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - Stable Economic Cooperation

T2 - A Relational Approach

AU - Gilles, R.P.

AU - Lazarova, E.A.

AU - Ruys, P.H.M.

N1 - Pagination: 47

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - We consider a relational economy in which economic agents participate in three types of relational economic activities: autarkic activities; binary matching activities; and plural cooperative activities. We introduce a stability notion and characterize stable interaction structures, both in the absence of externalities from cooperation as well as in the presence of size-based externalities. It is shown that institutional elements such as the emergence of socio-economic roles and organizations based on hierarchical leadership structures support and promote stable economic development.

AB - We consider a relational economy in which economic agents participate in three types of relational economic activities: autarkic activities; binary matching activities; and plural cooperative activities. We introduce a stability notion and characterize stable interaction structures, both in the absence of externalities from cooperation as well as in the presence of size-based externalities. It is shown that institutional elements such as the emergence of socio-economic roles and organizations based on hierarchical leadership structures support and promote stable economic development.

KW - Cooperatives

KW - Networks

KW - Clubs

KW - Relational economies

KW - Stable matchings

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2008-25

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Stable Economic Cooperation

PB - Microeconomics

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Gilles RP, Lazarova EA, Ruys PHM. Stable Economic Cooperation: A Relational Approach. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 2008. (CentER Discussion Paper).