Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs

R.P. Gilles, S. Sarangi

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    Abstract

    Recently a variety of link-based stability concepts have emerged in the literature on game theoretic models of social network formation.We investigate two basic formation properties that establish equivalence between some well known types of stable networks and their natural extensions.These properties can be identified as convexity conditions on the network payoff structures.
    Original languageEnglish
    Place of PublicationTilburg
    PublisherVakgroep CentER
    Number of pages11
    Volume2005-84
    Publication statusPublished - 2005

    Publication series

    NameCentER Discussion Paper
    Volume2005-84

    Keywords

    • social networks
    • network formation
    • pairwise stability

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  • Cite this

    Gilles, R. P., & Sarangi, S. (2005). Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2005-84). Vakgroep CentER.