Stable partial cooperation in managing systems with tipping points

F. Wagener, Aart de Zeeuw

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Tipping of a natural system, entailing a loss of ecosystem services, may be prevented by stable partial cooperation. The presence of tipping points reverses the grim story that a high level of cooperation is hard to achieve and leaves large possible gains of cooperation. We investigate a tipping game with constant emissions and a piecewise linear response, and the well-known lake system with concave-convex dynamics and time-dependent emissions. Tipping back, leading to a gain in services, can also be induced by stable partial cooperation, but is harder to achieve. A physically reversible natural system may prove to be socially irreversible.
Original languageEnglish
Article number102499
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Volume109
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2021

Keywords

  • CLIMATE-CHANGE
  • Ecological systems
  • MANAGEMENT
  • Multiple Nash equilibria
  • NASH EQUILIBRIA
  • POLICY
  • PRICE
  • Stable partial cooperation
  • Tipping points

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