Abstract
In this paper a new class of relaxed sequencing games is introduced: the class
of Step out - Step in sequencing games. In this relaxation any player within a coalition is allowed to step out from his position in the processing order and to
step in at any position later in the processing order. Providing an upper bound on
the values of the coalitions we show that every Step out - Step in sequencing game
has a non-empty core. This upper bound is a sufficient condition for a sequencing
game to have a non-empty core. Moreover, this paper provides a polynomial time
algorithm to determine the coalitional values of Step out - Step in sequencing games.
of Step out - Step in sequencing games. In this relaxation any player within a coalition is allowed to step out from his position in the processing order and to
step in at any position later in the processing order. Providing an upper bound on
the values of the coalitions we show that every Step out - Step in sequencing game
has a non-empty core. This upper bound is a sufficient condition for a sequencing
game to have a non-empty core. Moreover, this paper provides a polynomial time
algorithm to determine the coalitional values of Step out - Step in sequencing games.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Tilburg |
| Publisher | CentER, Center for Economic Research |
| Number of pages | 31 |
| Volume | 2014-070 |
| Publication status | Published - 2 Dec 2014 |
Publication series
| Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
|---|---|
| Volume | 2014-070 |
Keywords
- cooperative game theory
- sequencing games
- core