Step out - Step in Sequencing Games

M. Musegaas, P.E.M. Borm, M. Quant

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

In this paper a new class of relaxed sequencing games is introduced: the class
of Step out - Step in sequencing games. In this relaxation any player within a coalition is allowed to step out from his position in the processing order and to
step in at any position later in the processing order. Providing an upper bound on
the values of the coalitions we show that every Step out - Step in sequencing game
has a non-empty core. This upper bound is a sufficient condition for a sequencing
game to have a non-empty core. Moreover, this paper provides a polynomial time
algorithm to determine the coalitional values of Step out - Step in sequencing games.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages31
Volume2014-070
Publication statusPublished - 2 Dec 2014

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2014-070

Fingerprint

Processing
Polynomials

Keywords

  • cooperative game theory
  • sequencing games
  • core

Cite this

Musegaas, M., Borm, P. E. M., & Quant, M. (2014). Step out - Step in Sequencing Games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2014-070). Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Musegaas, M. ; Borm, P.E.M. ; Quant, M. / Step out - Step in Sequencing Games. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2014. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Musegaas, M, Borm, PEM & Quant, M 2014 'Step out - Step in Sequencing Games' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2014-070, CentER, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg.

Step out - Step in Sequencing Games. / Musegaas, M.; Borm, P.E.M.; Quant, M.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2014. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2014-070).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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N2 - In this paper a new class of relaxed sequencing games is introduced: the classof Step out - Step in sequencing games. In this relaxation any player within a coalition is allowed to step out from his position in the processing order and tostep in at any position later in the processing order. Providing an upper bound onthe values of the coalitions we show that every Step out - Step in sequencing gamehas a non-empty core. This upper bound is a sufficient condition for a sequencinggame to have a non-empty core. Moreover, this paper provides a polynomial timealgorithm to determine the coalitional values of Step out - Step in sequencing games.

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Musegaas M, Borm PEM, Quant M. Step out - Step in Sequencing Games. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research. 2014 Dec 2. (CentER Discussion Paper).