Step out-step in sequencing games

Marieke Musegaas, Peter Borm, Marieke Quant

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper a new class of relaxed sequencing games is introduced: the class of Step out–Step in sequencing games. In this relaxation any player within a coalition is allowed to step out from his position in the processing order and to step in at any position later in the processing order. First, we show that if the value of a coalition in a relaxed sequencing game is bounded from above by the gains made by all possible neighbor switches, then the game has a non-empty core. After that, we show that this is the case for Step out –Step in sequencing games. Moreover, this paper provides a polynomial time algorithm to determine the values of the coalitions in Step out–Step in sequencing games
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)894 - 906
Number of pages12
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume246
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2015

Fingerprint

Sequencing
Game
Coalitions
Processing
Switches
Polynomials
Polynomial-time Algorithm
Switch
Class
Order processing

Keywords

  • (Cooperative) game theory
  • Sequencing games
  • Core

Cite this

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Step out-step in sequencing games. / Musegaas, Marieke; Borm, Peter; Quant, Marieke.

In: European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 246, No. 3, 01.11.2015, p. 894 - 906.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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AU - Borm, Peter

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