Stochastic bankruptcy games

Helga Habis, P. Jean Jacques Herings*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review


We study bankruptcy problems where the estate and the claims have stochastic values and we allow these values to be correlated. We associate a transferable utility game with uncertainty to a stochastic bankruptcy problem and use the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept for such games. We test the stability of a number of well known division rules in this stochastic setting and find that all of them are unstable, with the exception of the stochastic extension of the Constrained Equal Awards rule which leads to a Weak Sequential Core element.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)973-988
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2013
Externally publishedYes


  • Transferable utility games
  • Uncertainty
  • Weak Sequential Core
  • Bankruptcy games
  • CORE


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