@techreport{5320d4b82e724ef1987fbad74bb228a9,
title = "Strategic delegation of responsibility in competing firms",
abstract = "This paper investigates the strategic impact of organizational design on product market competition. In a duopoly model of horizontal and vertical product differentiation, each firm's manager can impose a product location, or delegate responsibility to select product location to his subordinate. The task of a subordinate is to develop and produce the good. Quality is determined by his effort level, which depends on his private benefits. The managers compete on a product market by selling the goods produced by their subordinates. Conditions for existence of equilibria are derived, and implications for management strategy are discussed",
keywords = "Oligopoly, Competition, Product Differentiation, Organizational Structure, Corporate Strategy, business economics",
author = "{de Bijl}, P.W.J.",
note = "Pagination: 25",
year = "1995",
language = "English",
volume = "1995-33",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Unknown Publisher",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Unknown Publisher",
}