Strategic delegation of responsibility in competing firms

P.W.J. de Bijl

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

271 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This paper investigates the strategic impact of organizational design on product market competition. In a duopoly model of horizontal and vertical product differentiation, each firm's manager can impose a product location, or delegate responsibility to select product location to his subordinate. The task of a subordinate is to develop and produce the good. Quality is determined by his effort level, which depends on his private benefits. The managers compete on a product market by selling the goods produced by their subordinates. Conditions for existence of equilibria are derived, and implications for management strategy are discussed
Original languageEnglish
PublisherUnknown Publisher
Number of pages25
Volume1995-33
Publication statusPublished - 1995

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1995-33

Fingerprint

Strategic delegation
Responsibility
Managers
Private benefits
Existence of equilibrium
Management strategy
Horizontal product differentiation
Organizational design
Product market
Product market competition
Vertical product differentiation
Duopoly

Keywords

  • Oligopoly
  • Competition
  • Product Differentiation
  • Organizational Structure
  • Corporate Strategy
  • business economics

Cite this

de Bijl, P. W. J. (1995). Strategic delegation of responsibility in competing firms. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1995-33). Unknown Publisher.
de Bijl, P.W.J. / Strategic delegation of responsibility in competing firms. Unknown Publisher, 1995. (CentER Discussion Paper).
@techreport{5320d4b82e724ef1987fbad74bb228a9,
title = "Strategic delegation of responsibility in competing firms",
abstract = "This paper investigates the strategic impact of organizational design on product market competition. In a duopoly model of horizontal and vertical product differentiation, each firm's manager can impose a product location, or delegate responsibility to select product location to his subordinate. The task of a subordinate is to develop and produce the good. Quality is determined by his effort level, which depends on his private benefits. The managers compete on a product market by selling the goods produced by their subordinates. Conditions for existence of equilibria are derived, and implications for management strategy are discussed",
keywords = "Oligopoly, Competition, Product Differentiation, Organizational Structure, Corporate Strategy, business economics",
author = "{de Bijl}, P.W.J.",
note = "Pagination: 25",
year = "1995",
language = "English",
volume = "1995-33",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Unknown Publisher",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Unknown Publisher",

}

de Bijl, PWJ 1995 'Strategic delegation of responsibility in competing firms' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1995-33, Unknown Publisher.

Strategic delegation of responsibility in competing firms. / de Bijl, P.W.J.

Unknown Publisher, 1995. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1995-33).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - Strategic delegation of responsibility in competing firms

AU - de Bijl, P.W.J.

N1 - Pagination: 25

PY - 1995

Y1 - 1995

N2 - This paper investigates the strategic impact of organizational design on product market competition. In a duopoly model of horizontal and vertical product differentiation, each firm's manager can impose a product location, or delegate responsibility to select product location to his subordinate. The task of a subordinate is to develop and produce the good. Quality is determined by his effort level, which depends on his private benefits. The managers compete on a product market by selling the goods produced by their subordinates. Conditions for existence of equilibria are derived, and implications for management strategy are discussed

AB - This paper investigates the strategic impact of organizational design on product market competition. In a duopoly model of horizontal and vertical product differentiation, each firm's manager can impose a product location, or delegate responsibility to select product location to his subordinate. The task of a subordinate is to develop and produce the good. Quality is determined by his effort level, which depends on his private benefits. The managers compete on a product market by selling the goods produced by their subordinates. Conditions for existence of equilibria are derived, and implications for management strategy are discussed

KW - Oligopoly

KW - Competition

KW - Product Differentiation

KW - Organizational Structure

KW - Corporate Strategy

KW - business economics

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 1995-33

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Strategic delegation of responsibility in competing firms

PB - Unknown Publisher

ER -

de Bijl PWJ. Strategic delegation of responsibility in competing firms. Unknown Publisher. 1995. (CentER Discussion Paper).