Strategic Equilibrium

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Abstract

An outcome in a noncooperative game is said to be self-enforcing, or a strategic equilibrium, if, whenever it is recommended to the players, no player has an incentive to deviate from it.This paper gives an overview of the concepts that have been proposed as formalizations of this requirement and of the properties and the applications of these concepts.In particular the paper discusses Nash equilibrium, together with its main coarsenings (correlated equilibrium, rationalizibility) and its main refinements (sequential, perfect, proper, persistent and stable equilibria).There is also an extensive discussion on equilibrium selection.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages112
Volume2000-115
Publication statusPublished - 2000

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2000-115

Fingerprint

Nash equilibrium
Equilibrium selection
Formalization
Incentives
Non-cooperative game
Correlated equilibrium

Keywords

  • noncooperative games
  • equilibrium analysis

Cite this

van Damme, E. E. C. (2000). Strategic Equilibrium. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2000-115). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
van Damme, E.E.C. / Strategic Equilibrium. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2000. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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van Damme, EEC 2000 'Strategic Equilibrium' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2000-115, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

Strategic Equilibrium. / van Damme, E.E.C.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2000. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2000-115).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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N2 - An outcome in a noncooperative game is said to be self-enforcing, or a strategic equilibrium, if, whenever it is recommended to the players, no player has an incentive to deviate from it.This paper gives an overview of the concepts that have been proposed as formalizations of this requirement and of the properties and the applications of these concepts.In particular the paper discusses Nash equilibrium, together with its main coarsenings (correlated equilibrium, rationalizibility) and its main refinements (sequential, perfect, proper, persistent and stable equilibria).There is also an extensive discussion on equilibrium selection.

AB - An outcome in a noncooperative game is said to be self-enforcing, or a strategic equilibrium, if, whenever it is recommended to the players, no player has an incentive to deviate from it.This paper gives an overview of the concepts that have been proposed as formalizations of this requirement and of the properties and the applications of these concepts.In particular the paper discusses Nash equilibrium, together with its main coarsenings (correlated equilibrium, rationalizibility) and its main refinements (sequential, perfect, proper, persistent and stable equilibria).There is also an extensive discussion on equilibrium selection.

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van Damme EEC. Strategic Equilibrium. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 2000. (CentER Discussion Paper).