Strategic Generation Capacity Choice under Demand Uncertainty: Analysis of Nash Equilibria in Electricity Markets

G. Gürkan, O. Ozdemir, Y. Smeers

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Abstract: We analyze a two-stage game of strategic firms facing uncertain demand and exerting market power in decentralized electricity markets. These firms choose their generation capacities at the first stage while anticipating a perfectly competitive future electricity spot market outcome at the second stage; thus it is a closed loop game. In general, such games can be formulated as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) and examples have been posed in the literature that have multiple or no equilibria. Therefore, it is of interest to define general sets of conditions under which solutions exist and are unique, which would enhance the value of such models for policy andmarket intelligence purposes. In this paper, we consider various types of such a closed loop model regarding the underlying price-demand relations (elastic and inelastic demand), the assumed demand uncertainty with a broad class of continuous distributions, and any finite number of players with symmetric or asymmetric costs. We establish sufficient conditions for the random demand’s probability distribution which guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria in most of the cases of this closed loop model. We identify a broad class of commonly used continuous probability distributions satisfying these conditions.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
Number of pages55
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper


  • electricity markets
  • strategic generation investment modeling
  • demand uncertainty
  • existence and uniqueness of equilibrium


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