Strategic R&D with Knowledge Spillovers and Endogenous Time to Complete

R. Lukach, P.M. Kort, J.E.J. Plasmans

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Abstract

It is shown that asymmetry in R&D efficiency between firms is an important factor determining feasibility of the preemption and attrition scenarios in competitive R&D with time to build. Scenarios of attrition and preemption games are most likely to occur when competitors have similar R&D efficiencies. In case of largely asymmetric firms the games of attrition and preemption are very unlikely, thus the R&D duration choices of firms are determined by the actual trade-off between the benefits of earlier innovation and the costs of faster R&D project completion.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherOperations research
Number of pages31
Volume2007-38
Publication statusPublished - 2007

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2007-38

Keywords

  • R&D Investment
  • Competition
  • Preemption
  • Attrition

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    Lukach, R., Kort, P. M., & Plasmans, J. E. J. (2007). Strategic R&D with Knowledge Spillovers and Endogenous Time to Complete. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2007-38). Operations research.