@techreport{58287d747d7e42d7a6545a7a98ae2791,
title = "Strategic R&D with Knowledge Spillovers and Endogenous Time to Complete",
abstract = "It is shown that asymmetry in R&D efficiency between firms is an important factor determining feasibility of the preemption and attrition scenarios in competitive R&D with time to build. Scenarios of attrition and preemption games are most likely to occur when competitors have similar R&D efficiencies. In case of largely asymmetric firms the games of attrition and preemption are very unlikely, thus the R&D duration choices of firms are determined by the actual trade-off between the benefits of earlier innovation and the costs of faster R&D project completion.",
keywords = "R&D Investment, Competition, Preemption, Attrition",
author = "R. Lukach and P.M. Kort and J.E.J. Plasmans",
note = "Pagination: 31",
year = "2007",
language = "English",
volume = "2007-38",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Operations research",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Operations research",
}