Abstract
It is shown that asymmetry in R&D efficiency between firms is an important factor determining feasibility of the preemption and attrition scenarios in competitive R&D with time to build. Scenarios of attrition and preemption games are most likely to occur when competitors have similar R&D efficiencies. In case of largely asymmetric firms the games of attrition and preemption are very unlikely, thus the R&D duration choices of firms are determined by the actual trade-off between the benefits of earlier innovation and the costs of faster R&D project completion.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Tilburg |
| Publisher | Operations research |
| Number of pages | 31 |
| Volume | 2007-38 |
| Publication status | Published - 2007 |
Publication series
| Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
|---|---|
| Volume | 2007-38 |
Keywords
- R&D Investment
- Competition
- Preemption
- Attrition
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Lukach, R., Kort, P. M., & Plasmans, J. E. J. (2007). Strategic R&D with Knowledge Spillovers and Endogenous Time to Complete. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2007-38). Operations research.