Strategic vs Non-Strategic Motivations of Sanctioning

J. Vyrastekova, Y. Funaki, A. Takeuchi

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

231 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We isolate strategic and non-strategic motivations of sanctioning in a repeated public goods game. In two experimental treatments, subjects play the public goods game with the possibility to sanction others. In the STANDARD sanctions treatment, each subject learns about the sanctions received in the same round as they were assigned, but in the SECRET sanctions treatment, sanctions are announced only after the experiment is finished, removing in this way all strategic reasons to punish. We find that sanctioning is similar in both treatments, giving support for nonstrategic explanations of sanctions (altruistic punishment). Interestingly, contributions to the public good in both treatments with sanctioning are higher than when the public goods game is played without any sanctioning, irrespective of announcing the sanctions to their receivers during the play of the game, or only after the game is finished. The mere knowledge that sanctions might be assigned increases cooperation: subjects correctly expect that nonstrategic sanctioning takes place against freeriders.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages33
Volume2008-48
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2008-48

Keywords

  • altruistic punishment
  • nonstrategic sanctions
  • strategic sanctions
  • public goods
  • economic experiment

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Strategic vs Non-Strategic Motivations of Sanctioning'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this