Strong Nash Equilibria and the Potential Maimizer

F.J.C. van Megen, G. Facchini, P.E.M. Borm, S.H. Tijs

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

Abstract

A class of non cooperative games characterized by a `congestion e ect' is studied, in which there exists a strong Nash equilibrium, and the set of Nash equilibria, the set of strong Nash equilibria and the set of strategy pro les maximizing the potential function coincide.The structure of the class is investigated and it turns out that this class constitutes a cone.Remarks on strictly strong Nash equilibria and relaxations are provided.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherOperations research
Number of pages13
Volume1996-13
Publication statusPublished - 1996

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1996-13

Keywords

  • noncooperative games
  • Nash equilibrium

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