Supermodular NTU-games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

An NTU-game consists of payoff sets for every coalition of players. We introduce the concept of supermodularity of a game to guarantee that all its marginal vectors are in the core. As solution we propose a set of payoff vectors that is determined by the average of all marginal vectors, the Shapley set. Conditions are given under which the Shapley set is in the core of the game or is a set of bargaining solutions of a well-defined bargaining problem.
LanguageEnglish
Pages446-450
Number of pages5
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume44
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 23 Apr 2016

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NTU Games
Bargaining
Supermodularity
Game
Set of vectors
Coalitions
Well-defined
NTU games

Keywords

  • core
  • Shapley value
  • convexity
  • supermodularity
  • marginal vector

Cite this

Talman, Dolf ; Koshevoy, G.A. ; Suzuki, Takamasa. / Supermodular NTU-games. In: Operations Research Letters. 2016 ; Vol. 44, No. 4. pp. 446-450
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Supermodular NTU-games. / Talman, Dolf; Koshevoy, G.A.; Suzuki, Takamasa.

In: Operations Research Letters, Vol. 44, No. 4, 23.04.2016, p. 446-450.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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AB - An NTU-game consists of payoff sets for every coalition of players. We introduce the concept of supermodularity of a game to guarantee that all its marginal vectors are in the core. As solution we propose a set of payoff vectors that is determined by the average of all marginal vectors, the Shapley set. Conditions are given under which the Shapley set is in the core of the game or is a set of bargaining solutions of a well-defined bargaining problem.

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Talman D, Koshevoy GA, Suzuki T. Supermodular NTU-games. Operations Research Letters. 2016 Apr 23;44(4):446-450. Available from, DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2016.04.007