Supermodular NTU-games

Dolf Talman; G.A. Koshevoy; Takamasa Suzuki

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2016.04.007

Supermodular NTU-games

Dolf Talman, G.A. Koshevoy, Takamasa Suzuki

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

An NTU-game consists of payoff sets for every coalition of players. We introduce the concept of supermodularity of a game to guarantee that all its marginal vectors are in the core. As solution we propose a set of payoff vectors that is determined by the average of all marginal vectors, the Shapley set. Conditions are given under which the Shapley set is in the core of the game or is a set of bargaining solutions of a well-defined bargaining problem.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	446-450
Number of pages	5
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	44
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2016.04.007
Publication status	Published - 23 Apr 2016

Keywords

core
Shapley value
convexity
supermodularity
marginal vector

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10.1016/j.orl.2016.04.007

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abstract = "An NTU-game consists of payoff sets for every coalition of players. We introduce the concept of supermodularity of a game to guarantee that all its marginal vectors are in the core. As solution we propose a set of payoff vectors that is determined by the average of all marginal vectors, the Shapley set. Conditions are given under which the Shapley set is in the core of the game or is a set of bargaining solutions of a well-defined bargaining problem.",

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AB - An NTU-game consists of payoff sets for every coalition of players. We introduce the concept of supermodularity of a game to guarantee that all its marginal vectors are in the core. As solution we propose a set of payoff vectors that is determined by the average of all marginal vectors, the Shapley set. Conditions are given under which the Shapley set is in the core of the game or is a set of bargaining solutions of a well-defined bargaining problem.

KW - core

KW - Shapley value

KW - convexity

KW - supermodularity

KW - marginal vector

U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2016.04.007

DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2016.04.007

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VL - 44

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JO - Operations Research Letters

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Supermodular NTU-games

Abstract

Keywords

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