Opschorting en Onenigheid

Translated title of the contribution: Suspension and Disagreement

P. M. van der Kolk, Sander Verhaegh

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Some sceptics claim that in cases of peer disagreement, we ought to suspend judgment about the topic of discussion. In this paper, we argue that the sceptic’s conclusions are only correct in some scenarios. We show that the sceptic’s conclusion is built on two premises (the principle of evidential symmetry and the principle of evidentialism) and argue that both premises are incorrect. First, we show that although it is often rational to suspend judgment when an epistemic peer disagrees with you, peer disagreements are not symmetrical. Next, we argue that even if one assumes that peer disagreements are symmetrical, it might still be rational to stick to one’s guns in the light of peer disagreement.
Original languageDutch
Pages (from-to)37-52
JournalAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte
Volume108
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2016
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Suspension
Peer Disagreement
Skeptics
Scenarios
Evidentialism
Evidentials
Symmetry
Peers

Cite this

van der Kolk, P. M. ; Verhaegh, Sander. / Opschorting en Onenigheid. In: Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte. 2016 ; Vol. 108, No. 1. pp. 37-52.
@article{c5c0b0d393a54164a18fd6ee5a9f17a3,
title = "Opschorting en Onenigheid",
abstract = "Some sceptics claim that in cases of peer disagreement, we ought to suspend judgment about the topic of discussion. In this paper, we argue that the sceptic’s conclusions are only correct in some scenarios. We show that the sceptic’s conclusion is built on two premises (the principle of evidential symmetry and the principle of evidentialism) and argue that both premises are incorrect. First, we show that although it is often rational to suspend judgment when an epistemic peer disagrees with you, peer disagreements are not symmetrical. Next, we argue that even if one assumes that peer disagreements are symmetrical, it might still be rational to stick to one’s guns in the light of peer disagreement.",
author = "{van der Kolk}, {P. M.} and Sander Verhaegh",
year = "2016",
language = "Dutch",
volume = "108",
pages = "37--52",
journal = "Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte",
issn = "0002-5275",
number = "1",

}

Opschorting en Onenigheid. / van der Kolk, P. M.; Verhaegh, Sander.

In: Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, Vol. 108, No. 1, 2016, p. 37-52.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Opschorting en Onenigheid

AU - van der Kolk, P. M.

AU - Verhaegh, Sander

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - Some sceptics claim that in cases of peer disagreement, we ought to suspend judgment about the topic of discussion. In this paper, we argue that the sceptic’s conclusions are only correct in some scenarios. We show that the sceptic’s conclusion is built on two premises (the principle of evidential symmetry and the principle of evidentialism) and argue that both premises are incorrect. First, we show that although it is often rational to suspend judgment when an epistemic peer disagrees with you, peer disagreements are not symmetrical. Next, we argue that even if one assumes that peer disagreements are symmetrical, it might still be rational to stick to one’s guns in the light of peer disagreement.

AB - Some sceptics claim that in cases of peer disagreement, we ought to suspend judgment about the topic of discussion. In this paper, we argue that the sceptic’s conclusions are only correct in some scenarios. We show that the sceptic’s conclusion is built on two premises (the principle of evidential symmetry and the principle of evidentialism) and argue that both premises are incorrect. First, we show that although it is often rational to suspend judgment when an epistemic peer disagrees with you, peer disagreements are not symmetrical. Next, we argue that even if one assumes that peer disagreements are symmetrical, it might still be rational to stick to one’s guns in the light of peer disagreement.

M3 - Article

VL - 108

SP - 37

EP - 52

JO - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte

JF - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte

SN - 0002-5275

IS - 1

ER -