Symmetric Convex Games and Stable Structures

M. Slikker, H.W. Norde

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Abstract

We study the model of link formation that was introduced by Aumann and Myerson (1988) and focus on symmetric convex games with transferable utilities. We answer an open question in the literature by showing that in a specific symmetric convex game with six players a structure that results in the same payoffs as the full cooperation structure can be formed according to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages25
Volume2004-114
Publication statusPublished - 2004

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2004-114

Keywords

  • symmetric convex game
  • undirected graph
  • link formation
  • stable structures

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    Slikker, M., & Norde, H. W. (2004). Symmetric Convex Games and Stable Structures. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2004-114). Microeconomics.