This Ph.D.-thesis analyzes the possible economic roles of takeover barriers. Although it is well known that takeover barriers play an important role in corporate control battles, their influence actually extends to far more issues, most of which concern important corporate activities. A thorough understanding of takeover barriers is hence desirable. The thesis starts with two, economically useful, classifications of barriers: (i) pre-offer versus post-offer types, and (ii) active versus passive types. Next, a complete overview of economic roles of barriers, as known from the literature, is given. The subsequent chapters deal with three new barrier functions: (i) their use to signal undervaluation, (ii) the effects of non-voting versus voting equity, and (iii) the role of the equity ownership structure in takeovers. The last two issues shed some light on corporate governance too.
|Qualification||Doctor of Philosophy|
|Award date||29 Nov 1996|
|Place of Publication||Tilburg|
|Publication status||Published - 1996|