Takeover barriers

The good, the bad and the ugly

H. Oosterhout

Research output: ThesisDoctoral ThesisScientific

244 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This Ph.D.-thesis analyzes the possible economic roles of takeover barriers. Although it is well known that takeover barriers play an important role in corporate control battles, their influence actually extends to far more issues, most of which concern important corporate activities. A thorough understanding of takeover barriers is hence desirable. The thesis starts with two, economically useful, classifications of barriers: (i) pre-offer versus post-offer types, and (ii) active versus passive types. Next, a complete overview of economic roles of barriers, as known from the literature, is given. The subsequent chapters deal with three new barrier functions: (i) their use to signal undervaluation, (ii) the effects of non-voting versus voting equity, and (iii) the role of the equity ownership structure in takeovers. The last two issues shed some light on corporate governance too.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • Tilburg University
Supervisors/Advisors
  • Moerland, P.W., Promotor
  • Barkema, H.G., Promotor
  • van Damme, Eric, Promotor
Award date29 Nov 1996
Place of PublicationTilburg
Publisher
Print ISBNs905668020X
Publication statusPublished - 1996

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Economics
Equity
Equity ownership
Corporate governance
Ownership structure
Corporate control
Voting
Undervaluation

Cite this

Oosterhout, H. (1996). Takeover barriers: The good, the bad and the ugly. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Oosterhout, H.. / Takeover barriers : The good, the bad and the ugly. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 1996. 285 p.
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abstract = "This Ph.D.-thesis analyzes the possible economic roles of takeover barriers. Although it is well known that takeover barriers play an important role in corporate control battles, their influence actually extends to far more issues, most of which concern important corporate activities. A thorough understanding of takeover barriers is hence desirable. The thesis starts with two, economically useful, classifications of barriers: (i) pre-offer versus post-offer types, and (ii) active versus passive types. Next, a complete overview of economic roles of barriers, as known from the literature, is given. The subsequent chapters deal with three new barrier functions: (i) their use to signal undervaluation, (ii) the effects of non-voting versus voting equity, and (iii) the role of the equity ownership structure in takeovers. The last two issues shed some light on corporate governance too.",
author = "H. Oosterhout",
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Oosterhout, H 1996, 'Takeover barriers: The good, the bad and the ugly', Doctor of Philosophy, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Takeover barriers : The good, the bad and the ugly. / Oosterhout, H.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 1996. 285 p.

Research output: ThesisDoctoral ThesisScientific

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T1 - Takeover barriers

T2 - The good, the bad and the ugly

AU - Oosterhout, H.

PY - 1996

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N2 - This Ph.D.-thesis analyzes the possible economic roles of takeover barriers. Although it is well known that takeover barriers play an important role in corporate control battles, their influence actually extends to far more issues, most of which concern important corporate activities. A thorough understanding of takeover barriers is hence desirable. The thesis starts with two, economically useful, classifications of barriers: (i) pre-offer versus post-offer types, and (ii) active versus passive types. Next, a complete overview of economic roles of barriers, as known from the literature, is given. The subsequent chapters deal with three new barrier functions: (i) their use to signal undervaluation, (ii) the effects of non-voting versus voting equity, and (iii) the role of the equity ownership structure in takeovers. The last two issues shed some light on corporate governance too.

AB - This Ph.D.-thesis analyzes the possible economic roles of takeover barriers. Although it is well known that takeover barriers play an important role in corporate control battles, their influence actually extends to far more issues, most of which concern important corporate activities. A thorough understanding of takeover barriers is hence desirable. The thesis starts with two, economically useful, classifications of barriers: (i) pre-offer versus post-offer types, and (ii) active versus passive types. Next, a complete overview of economic roles of barriers, as known from the literature, is given. The subsequent chapters deal with three new barrier functions: (i) their use to signal undervaluation, (ii) the effects of non-voting versus voting equity, and (iii) the role of the equity ownership structure in takeovers. The last two issues shed some light on corporate governance too.

M3 - Doctoral Thesis

SN - 905668020X

T3 - CentER Dissertation Series

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Oosterhout H. Takeover barriers: The good, the bad and the ugly. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research, 1996. 285 p. (CentER Dissertation Series).