Tax compliance depends on voice of taxpayers

Sandro Casal*, C. Kogler, Luigi Mittone, Erich Kirchler

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Reducing the social distance between taxpayers and tax authorities boosts taxpayers' acceptance of tax load and tax compliance. In the present experiment participants had the opportunity to pay their tax due either as one single compliance decision or as separate compliance decisions for each type of requested contribution (coined voice on contributions). In addition, contributions were either distributed according to a fixed scheme exogenously chosen, or participants had the possibility to change the distribution pattern (coined voice on distribution). Furthermore information about participants' contributions was either clearly related to the tax context or related to government public expenditures (coined context). Besides analyzing the effect of voice and context on compliance, order of tax payments was controlled for in the analyses. Results show that having voice on tax contributions and on tax distribution leads to higher compliance. Moreover, compliance was higher in the context avoiding tax framing. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)141-150
JournalJournal of Economic Psychology
Volume56
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2016

Keywords

  • Tax compliance
  • Tax evasion
  • Tax distribution
  • Voice
  • Procedural fairness
  • WHAT-YOU-WANT
  • FAIRNESS
  • EVASION

Cite this

Casal, Sandro ; Kogler, C. ; Mittone, Luigi ; Kirchler, Erich. / Tax compliance depends on voice of taxpayers. In: Journal of Economic Psychology. 2016 ; Vol. 56. pp. 141-150.
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Tax compliance depends on voice of taxpayers. / Casal, Sandro; Kogler, C.; Mittone, Luigi; Kirchler, Erich.

In: Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 56, 10.2016, p. 141-150.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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