Testing for the phenomenal: Intuition, metacognition, and philosophical methodology

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Recent empirical studies raise significant methodological concerns about the use of intuitions in philosophy. According to one prominent line of reply, these concerns are unwarranted since the empirical studies motivating them do not control for the putatively characteristic phenomenology of intuitions. This paper makes use of research on metacognitive states that share the phenomenology of intuitions to argue that this reply fails. Furthermore, it shows how empirical findings about these metacognitive states can help philosophers make better informed assessments of their warrant for relying on intuitions in inquiry.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)48-66
Number of pages19
JournalMind and Language
Volume35
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Feb 2020
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • BELIEF-BIAS
  • FLUENCY
  • MATCHING BIAS
  • SELECTION TASK
  • experimental philosophy
  • feeling of rightness
  • intuition
  • metacognition
  • phenomenalism
  • philosophical methodology

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