The aggregate-monotonic core

P. Calleja, C. Rafels, S.H. Tijs

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)


We introduce the aggregate-monotonic core as the set of allocations of a transferable utility cooperative game attainable by single-valued solutions that satisfy core-selection and aggregate-monotonicity. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the coincidence of the core and the aggregate-monotonic core. Finally, we introduce upper and lower aggregate-monotonicity for set-valued solutions, and characterize the aggregate-monotonic core using core-selection and upper and lower aggregatemonotonicity.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)742-748
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2009


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