The anatomy of man-made disasters: Implications of excess cooperation and whistleblowing for safety

Reducing the likelihood of man-made disasters that cause much harm to life, property, and the environment, is a key societal goal. To that end, regulatory agencies are responsible for ensuring man-made disasters do not occur. In order to accomplish this task, regulators invariably have to rely on, and cooperate with, operators. However, how much cooperation is optimal? In this study, we examine if and how (excess) cooperation between operators and regulators can lead to man-made disasters, and the role whistleblowers can play in attenuating such unwanted outcomes. We synthesize various theories and accounts of man-made disasters to construct a systems dynamics model of the dynamic mechanisms that lead up to them. We find that excess collaboration that arises as a consequence of bounded rationality, prompts operators and regulators to infer absence of accidents as evidence of safety. This mistaken inference contributes to drift of operational practices away from safety standards, thereby increasing the likelihood of a man-made disaster. To mitigate this tendency towards excess cooperation, we investigate the role whistleblowers can play in introducing necessary “friction” between operators and regulators, and find that timely whistleblowing can aid in mitigating man-made disasters. We provide managerial and policy implications including establishing internal informational channels, setting up a joint task force between operators and regulators, and incentivizing and safeguarding whistleblowers while protecting their target organizations from false claims. Finally, we offer a potentially fruitful new research direction for the OM community.