The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions

Elena Grigorieva; P. Jean-Jacques Herings; Rudolf Muller; Dries Vermeulen

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2005.07.011

The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions

Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Muller^*, Dries Vermeulen

^*Corresponding author for this work

Econometrics and Operations Research

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

Abstract

This paper is concerned with information revelation in single-item auctions. We compute how much data needs to be transmitted in three strategically equivalent auctions-the Vickrey auction, the English auction and the recently proposed bisection auction-and show that in the truth-telling equilibrium the bisection auction is the best performer. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	491-498
Number of pages	8
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	34
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2005.07.011
Publication status	Published - Sept 2006

Keywords

single-item auction
communication complexity
information revelation
data transmission

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10.1016/j.orl.2005.07.011

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title = "The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions",

abstract = "This paper is concerned with information revelation in single-item auctions. We compute how much data needs to be transmitted in three strategically equivalent auctions-the Vickrey auction, the English auction and the recently proposed bisection auction-and show that in the truth-telling equilibrium the bisection auction is the best performer. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.",

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AU - Muller, Rudolf

AU - Vermeulen, Dries

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N2 - This paper is concerned with information revelation in single-item auctions. We compute how much data needs to be transmitted in three strategically equivalent auctions-the Vickrey auction, the English auction and the recently proposed bisection auction-and show that in the truth-telling equilibrium the bisection auction is the best performer. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

AB - This paper is concerned with information revelation in single-item auctions. We compute how much data needs to be transmitted in three strategically equivalent auctions-the Vickrey auction, the English auction and the recently proposed bisection auction-and show that in the truth-telling equilibrium the bisection auction is the best performer. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

KW - single-item auction

KW - communication complexity

KW - information revelation

KW - data transmission

U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2005.07.011

DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2005.07.011

M3 - Article

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VL - 34

SP - 491

EP - 498

JO - Operations Research Letters

JF - Operations Research Letters

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The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions

Abstract

Keywords

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