The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions

Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Muller*, Dries Vermeulen

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review


This paper is concerned with information revelation in single-item auctions. We compute how much data needs to be transmitted in three strategically equivalent auctions-the Vickrey auction, the English auction and the recently proposed bisection auction-and show that in the truth-telling equilibrium the bisection auction is the best performer. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)491-498
Number of pages8
JournalOperations Research Letters
Issue number5
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2006


  • single-item auction
  • communication complexity
  • information revelation
  • data transmission


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