The Consensus Value: A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games

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Abstract

By generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases, this paper develops a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value.We characterize the consensus value as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity.By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided.By defining the stand-alone reduced game, a recursive formula for the value is established.We also show that this value is the average of the Shapley value and the equal surplus solution.Furthermore, we discuss a possible generalization.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages17
Volume2004-50
Publication statusPublished - 2004

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2004-50

Keywords

  • cooperative games
  • game theory

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