The Consensus Value

A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

By generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases, this paper develops a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value.We characterize the consensus value as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity.By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided.By defining the stand-alone reduced game, a recursive formula for the value is established.We also show that this value is the average of the Shapley value and the equal surplus solution.Furthermore, we discuss a possible generalization.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages17
Volume2004-50
Publication statusPublished - 2004

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2004-50

Fingerprint

Cooperative game
Solution concepts
Additivity
Surplus
Recursive formula
Shapley value
Symmetry
Reduced game

Keywords

  • cooperative games
  • game theory

Cite this

Ju, Y., Borm, P. E. M., & Ruys, P. H. M. (2004). The Consensus Value: A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2004-50). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Ju, Y. ; Borm, P.E.M. ; Ruys, P.H.M. / The Consensus Value : A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2004. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Ju, Y, Borm, PEM & Ruys, PHM 2004 'The Consensus Value: A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2004-50, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

The Consensus Value : A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games. / Ju, Y.; Borm, P.E.M.; Ruys, P.H.M.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2004. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2004-50).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - The Consensus Value

T2 - A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games

AU - Ju, Y.

AU - Borm, P.E.M.

AU - Ruys, P.H.M.

N1 - Subsequently published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2007 Pagination: 17

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - By generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases, this paper develops a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value.We characterize the consensus value as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity.By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided.By defining the stand-alone reduced game, a recursive formula for the value is established.We also show that this value is the average of the Shapley value and the equal surplus solution.Furthermore, we discuss a possible generalization.

AB - By generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases, this paper develops a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value.We characterize the consensus value as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity.By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided.By defining the stand-alone reduced game, a recursive formula for the value is established.We also show that this value is the average of the Shapley value and the equal surplus solution.Furthermore, we discuss a possible generalization.

KW - cooperative games

KW - game theory

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2004-50

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - The Consensus Value

PB - Microeconomics

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Ju Y, Borm PEM, Ruys PHM. The Consensus Value: A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 2004. (CentER Discussion Paper).