The Coordination of Capital Income and Profit Taxation with Cross-Ownership of Firms

H.P. Huizinga, S.B. Nielsen

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

This paper investigates the scope for international coordination of capital income and profit taxation.The paper considers a world of many symmetric countries where public goods are financed by taxes on capital income and on profits.In the open economy, the authorities have at their disposal a residence-based saving tax, a source-based investment tax and a profit tax. Determinants of the tax mix are the foreign ownership of domestic firms, if any, and the extent to which the profit tax is feasible.Noncooperative tax policy in the open economy is compared to the corresponding tax policy in the closed economy where a single tax instrument determines the wedge between the returns to saving and investment.There generally is a scope for a coordinated increase in this tax wedge if the noncoordinated tax wedge is negative or very large, and vice versa.There is no need for tax coordination if there is no foreign ownership or if profits are taxed fully.The cases for tax coordination when in the noncoordinated scenario there either is no saving tax or no investment tax are also considered.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMacroeconomics
Number of pages23
Volume1996-104
Publication statusPublished - 1996

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1996-104

Fingerprint

Tax
Cross-ownership
Income
Taxation
Profit
Tax policy
Foreign ownership
Tax coordination
Open economy
Tax wedge
Disposal
Authority
Scenarios
Domestic firms
Tax mix

Keywords

  • corporate ownership
  • capital
  • incomes
  • profits tax

Cite this

Huizinga, H. P., & Nielsen, S. B. (1996). The Coordination of Capital Income and Profit Taxation with Cross-Ownership of Firms. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1996-104). Tilburg: Macroeconomics.
Huizinga, H.P. ; Nielsen, S.B. / The Coordination of Capital Income and Profit Taxation with Cross-Ownership of Firms. Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 1996. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Huizinga, HP & Nielsen, SB 1996 'The Coordination of Capital Income and Profit Taxation with Cross-Ownership of Firms' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1996-104, Macroeconomics, Tilburg.

The Coordination of Capital Income and Profit Taxation with Cross-Ownership of Firms. / Huizinga, H.P.; Nielsen, S.B.

Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 1996. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1996-104).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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AB - This paper investigates the scope for international coordination of capital income and profit taxation.The paper considers a world of many symmetric countries where public goods are financed by taxes on capital income and on profits.In the open economy, the authorities have at their disposal a residence-based saving tax, a source-based investment tax and a profit tax. Determinants of the tax mix are the foreign ownership of domestic firms, if any, and the extent to which the profit tax is feasible.Noncooperative tax policy in the open economy is compared to the corresponding tax policy in the closed economy where a single tax instrument determines the wedge between the returns to saving and investment.There generally is a scope for a coordinated increase in this tax wedge if the noncoordinated tax wedge is negative or very large, and vice versa.There is no need for tax coordination if there is no foreign ownership or if profits are taxed fully.The cases for tax coordination when in the noncoordinated scenario there either is no saving tax or no investment tax are also considered.

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Huizinga HP, Nielsen SB. The Coordination of Capital Income and Profit Taxation with Cross-Ownership of Firms. Tilburg: Macroeconomics. 1996. (CentER Discussion Paper).