The cutting power of preparation

O.R.C. Tercieux, M. Voorneveld

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

In a strategic game, a curb set (Basu and Weibull, Econ Lett 36:141–146, 1991) is a product set of pure strategies containing all best responses to every possible belief restricted to this set. Prep sets (Voorneveld, Games Econ Behav 48:403–414, 2004) relax this condition by only requiring the presence of at least one best response to such a belief. The purpose of this paper is to provide sufficient conditions under which minimal prep sets give sharp predictions. These conditions are satisfied in many economically relevant classes of games, including supermodular games, potential games, and congestion games with player-specific payoffs. In these classes, minimal curb sets generically have a large cutting power as well, although it is shown that there are relevant subclasses of coordination games and congestion games where minimal curb sets have no cutting power at all and simply consist of the entire strategy space.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)85-101
JournalMathematical Methods of Operations Research
Volume71
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2010

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Curbs
Preparation
Game
Minimal Set
Congestion Games
Potential Games
Weibull
Best response
Congestion games
Entire
Prediction
Sufficient Conditions
Potential games
Pure strategies
Coordination games
Supermodular games
Strategic games

Cite this

Tercieux, O. R. C., & Voorneveld, M. (2010). The cutting power of preparation. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 71(1), 85-101.
Tercieux, O.R.C. ; Voorneveld, M. / The cutting power of preparation. In: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research. 2010 ; Vol. 71, No. 1. pp. 85-101.
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Tercieux, ORC & Voorneveld, M 2010, 'The cutting power of preparation', Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, vol. 71, no. 1, pp. 85-101.

The cutting power of preparation. / Tercieux, O.R.C.; Voorneveld, M.

In: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Vol. 71, No. 1, 2010, p. 85-101.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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Tercieux ORC, Voorneveld M. The cutting power of preparation. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research. 2010;71(1):85-101.