The Digital Markets Act: A partial solution to antitrust’s remedy problem

Friso Bostoen, David van Wamel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Antitrust remedies in digital markets have shown little effectiveness. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) offers a partial solution by establishing a multi-level remedial pyramid that addresses several of the challenges the Commission faced when remedying antitrust infringements. At the base of this pyramid are the DMA’s obligations, which embed ex ante remedies that are faster and more prescriptive than antitrust remedies. The second level consists of regulatory dialogue, an open and iterative specification procedure that can mitigate information asymmetries and future-proof remedies. The third level is the non-compliance procedure, which complements the regulatory dialogue. At the pyramid’s apex is the systematic non-compliance procedure. It empowers the Commission to impose ex post remedies, which can be more forceful than their EU competition law counterparts. Although the DMA enhances the Commission’s remedial process and powers compared to EU competition law, it is crucial for the Commission to exercise its authority judiciously. The Commission’s focus should be on the intermediate layers of the remedial pyramid, particularly the regulatory dialogue.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages32
JournalCommon Market Law Review
Volume61
Issue number6
Publication statusAccepted/In press - Dec 2024

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