The dynamics of leniency application and cartel enforcement spillovers

J. Zhou

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

Abstract

We study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels that were prosecuted by the European Commission (EC) between 1996 and 2014. The start of an EC investigation does not affect the rate at which conspirators apply for leniency in the market investigated but increases the rate of application in separate markets in which a conspirator in the investigated market also engaged in collusion. Our results shed light on enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of conspiracy.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages44
Publication statusPublished - 28 Feb 2016
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameTILEC Discussion Paper
Volume2016-006

Fingerprint

Cartel
Spillover
Leniency
Enforcement
Cartels
European Commission
Survival analysis
Collusion
Discrete-time

Keywords

  • leniency
  • cartels
  • collusion
  • multi-market contact
  • enforcement spillovers

Cite this

Zhou, J. (2016). The dynamics of leniency application and cartel enforcement spillovers. (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2016-006).
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Zhou, J 2016 'The dynamics of leniency application and cartel enforcement spillovers' TILEC Discussion Paper, vol. 2016-006.

The dynamics of leniency application and cartel enforcement spillovers. / Zhou, J.

2016. (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2016-006).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Zhou J. The dynamics of leniency application and cartel enforcement spillovers. 2016 Feb 28. (TILEC Discussion Paper).