The Economics of Roscas and Intra-Household Resource Allocation

K.S. Anderson, J-M. Baland

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

This paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations (roscas).Detailed evidence from roscas in a Kenyan slum (Nairobi) suggests that most roscas are predominantly composed of women, particularly those living in a couple and earning an independent income. To explain this phenomenon, we propose an argument based on conflictual interactions within the household.Participation in a rosca is a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption.The empirical implications of the model are then tested using the data collected in Kenya.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMacroeconomics
Number of pages38
Volume2000-83
Publication statusPublished - 2000

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2000-83

Fingerprint

Economics
Intrahousehold resource allocation
Savings
Credit
Slums
Participation
Income
Household
Kenya
Interaction

Keywords

  • Rosca
  • Gender
  • Household

Cite this

Anderson, K. S., & Baland, J-M. (2000). The Economics of Roscas and Intra-Household Resource Allocation. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2000-83). Tilburg: Macroeconomics.
Anderson, K.S. ; Baland, J-M. / The Economics of Roscas and Intra-Household Resource Allocation. Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 2000. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Anderson, KS & Baland, J-M 2000 'The Economics of Roscas and Intra-Household Resource Allocation' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2000-83, Macroeconomics, Tilburg.

The Economics of Roscas and Intra-Household Resource Allocation. / Anderson, K.S.; Baland, J-M.

Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 2000. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2000-83).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Anderson KS, Baland J-M. The Economics of Roscas and Intra-Household Resource Allocation. Tilburg: Macroeconomics. 2000. (CentER Discussion Paper).